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  Financial markets commentary over the first several months of 2003 repeatedly 
pointed to the potential for war with Iraq and increased military tensions with North 
Korea as primary explanations of daily movements in U.S. asset prices.  However, almost 
all of the “evidence” offered was based on the anecdotal accounts of market participants, 
and few market observers offered precise estimates of the effects.  One reason for the 
lack of formal estimates is the difficulty of measuring the effects of the risk of war, given 
that this risk is an unobservable variable.  Indeed, it is much easier to determine when 
news about the outlook for war took place than it is to quantify that news. 
  This paper attempts to empirically measure the effects of “war risk” on U.S. 
financial markets using a heteroskedasticity-based estimator similar to that explored in 
Rigobon and Sack (2002, 2003).
1  The advantage of this type of estimator is that it 
allows one to identify the impact of war risk without having to quantify the risk itself.  
In fact, implementing this estimator only requires that we are able to determine a set of 
days on which the variance of war-related news was elevated.  These days can be easily 
identified based on developments that significantly affected the outlook for war—for 
example, days on which President Bush addressed the nation regarding war, or Secretary 
Powell presented evidence on Iraq to the U.N. Security Council, or chief U.N. arms 
inspector Hans Blix released reports on Iraq.  Determining this set of days is sufficient to 
estimate the effects of the level of the war risk factor on various asset prices. 
  The results indicate that the risk of war had significant effects on a number of 
financial variables over this period.  In particular, increases in the risk of war caused 
considerable declines in Treasury yields and equity prices, a widening of corporate yield 
spreads, a fall in the dollar, and a rise in oil futures prices.  However, we do not find a 
significant response of liquidity premiums for on-the-run Treasury securities or of gold 
prices.  Taken together, the evidence indicates that greater war risk has been associated 
                                                 
1 The procedure of identification through heteroskedasticity was first introduced by Philip Wright (1928) 
and has been recently rediscovered by Sentana and Fiorentini (2001) and Rigobon (2003).  The first 
application of these estimators to U.S. financial markets can be found in Rigobon and Sack (2003), 
although the method used in this paper more closely follows the estimator developed in Rigobon and Sack 
(2002).  Ellingsen and Soderstrom (2001), Bohl, Siklos, and Werner (2003), and Evans and Lyons (2003) 
employ similar estimators.  3
with a shift by investors away from some risky assets, but not with a widespread flight 
into all safe assets or into the most liquid assets. 
  The results also indicate that the war risk factor explains a considerable portion of 
the variance of these financial variables (the ones with significant responses) over the 
ten-week period leading up to the onset of the war with Iraq.  Thus, it appears that this 
was a period of remarkable intensity of war-related news, and that any attempt to explain 
asset price behavior over this period must take this factor into consideration. 
 
A Heteroskedasticity-Based Estimation Method 
  Two primary difficulties arise in attempting to measure the effects of war risk on 
financial markets.  First, the risk of war is an unobservable variable, in that the war-
related news on any given day cannot be precisely quantified.  Second, other factors are 
continuously influencing asset prices in addition to the risk of war.  We will employ an 
estimator that addresses both of these considerations. 
  To add some structure to the problem, we assume that the daily changes in a set of 
financial variables can be characterized by a system of linear equations.  For simplicity, 
we will derive the estimator using two variables at a time.  The changes in those two 
financial variables, denoted        2 1 x x x , are assumed to be determined as follows: 














































A .     (1) 
According to equation (1), movements in the financial variables are driven by a set of 
common factors,     ... 3 2 1 z z z z , and a set of idiosyncratic shocks,     2 1    .
2  
The common factors include changes in monetary and fiscal policy, macroeconomic 
developments, news regarding the possibility of war, and any other variables that have a 
direct influence on a number of financial variables.  Some of these factors might be 
(partially) observable, while others are not.  The focus of this paper is on measuring the 
                                                 
2 We assume that the factors and idiosyncratic shocks have zero mean, given that they influence changes in 
the financial variables.  4
impact of the risk of war, which we will denote  1 z .  Given the difficulties in quantifying 
this factor, we take it to be completely unobservable. 
  Equation (1) allows for contemporaneous spillovers between the financial 
variables (the matrix  A).  We will instead concentrate on the reduced form of this system 
of equations: 













































,     (2) 
where  B A D  
1  and         
1
2 1 A .  The matrix D in equation (2) captures 
the direct impact of the common factors on the financial variables (after accounting for 
their influences on one another).  We will denote the elements of this matrix as follows:  













D ,     (3) 
where  ij d  represents the impact of the jth factor on the ith financial variable.  The first 
column of the matrix D captures the impact of the war risk factor on the two financial 
variables.   The impact of this factor on the first variable is normalized to unity, and its 
impact on the second variable is captured by the coefficient  21 d , which is the parameter 
that this paper attempts to estimate (for a number of different financial variables).
3 
  If the common factors were all observable, then equation (2) could simply be 
estimated using an OLS regression.  However, many of the common factors are likely to 
be unobservable.  Indeed, as noted above, a primary difficulty in estimating the impact 
of war risk is that one cannot easily quantify this variable.  This presumably is the case 
for a number of other factors as well.   
  We therefore rely on a heteroskedasticity-based approach to estimate the impact 
of the war risk factor.  The approach only requires that we can determine a set of dates 
on which the variance of war risk was elevated (discussed in more detail below), which 
we will refer to as “war news” days.  Of course, it is likely that news about the risk of 
                                                 
3 This normalization is necessary because the scale of the war risk factor otherwise is not determined.  5
war trickles out on other days as well, but the intensity of the war-related news is taken 
to be much higher on the war news days.   
  Determining a set of such days is sufficient to identify the effects of the level of 
the war risk factor on all financial variables.  The identification comes from the 
assumption that it is only the variance of the war risk factor that changes on those days.  
Other factors are still assumed to be present, but with the same intensity as on other 
days.  In addition, we impose the assumption that the war risk factor is orthogonal to the 
other factors, which seems quite plausible. 
  Under these assumptions, consider what happens to the variance-covariance 
matrix of the two financial variables, .  This matrix is determined by: 





































1 ,   (4) 
where  z   and     are the variance-covariance matrices of z and , respectively.  We 
can compute this variance-covariance matrix for the set of war news days, denoted  H  , 
and likewise for a set of other days (ones that contain less war-related news), denoted 
L  .  Under our identification assumptions, the change in the variance-covariance matrix 
between these sets of days,  L H      , must be driven entirely by the change in the 
variance of the war risk factor, or the (1,1) element of the matrix  z  .  More specifically: 















z  ,     (5) 
where ) ( 1
2 z    is the shift in the variance of the war risk factor. 
  As equation (5) makes clear, the shift in the variance-covariance matrix of the 
financial variables on the days of high war variance is shaped by the relative 
responsiveness of the financial variables to that factor.  As a result, we can derive several 
estimates of the parameter  21 d , as follows: 
     21 22 / ˆ    d       ( 6 )  
     11 21 / ˆ    d       ( 7 )  
  6
where  ij   denotes the (i, j) element of the matrix .
4  The results from these two 
estimators would be equal if the assumptions imposed held perfectly—namely, that the 
factors other than war risk are homoskedastic over our two sets of dates, and that the 
structure of the model is linear. 
  As shown in Rigobon and Sack (2002), these estimators can be implemented by 
an instrumental variables (IV) approach.  Define the instrument to be the change in the 
first financial variable,  1 x  , on all war news days, and the negative of its change,  1 x   , 
on an equal-sized set of other days: 
         L t x H t x t t          , , , 1 , 1 1  ,   (8) 
where H  and L denote the set of war risk days and other days, respectively.  Consider 
regressing the change in the second financial variable,  2 x  , on the change in the first 
financial variable,  1 x  , over both sets of dates using this instrument.  The standard IV 
estimator is  
     ) ( ) ( ˆ
2 1
1
1 1 x x d        
   ,     (9) 
which equals 
    
) ( ) (
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x Var x Var





    
 ,   (10) 
where the subscripts H  and L indicate the set of days over which the variances and 
covariances are taken.  The coefficient (10) is identical to the estimator (7).   
  Likewise, consider an alternative instrument defined in the exact same way, only 
using the second financial variable: 
         L t x H t x t t          , , , 2 , 2 2  .   (11) 
With this instrument, the IV estimator becomes 
    
) , ( ) , (
) ( ) ( ˆ
2 1 2 1
2 2
x x Cov x x Cov
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 ,   (12) 
which is identical to the estimator (6) above. 
                                                 
4 Note that a third estimator, equal to  11 21 /  , is also available.  However, we do not focus on 
this estimator, since it is just the geometric average of the first two.    7
  It can be shown that both  1   and  2   are valid instruments for this regression 
under the assumptions that have been imposed.  Thus, we can also estimate the regression 
by combining the two instruments,  2 1 3      , to arrive at a third estimator.  This 
estimator might be advantageous if one of the sets of instruments is relatively weak.
5  
  Overall, an advantage of implementing the heteroskedasticity-based estimator in 
this manner is that all of the properties of the IV estimator apply, including the 
asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimate.  We now turn to the application of 
these estimators. 
 
Application to War Risk 
  To implement this estimation method, one must first identify a set of dates on 
which the variance of war risk was elevated.  By reading newspapers and various 
financial market commentary, we collected a list of 17 dates on which war-related events 
appeared to be the primary determinant of asset price movements, which is shown in 
Table 1.
6  As argued above, it is difficult to precisely quantify the war-related news on 
these days.  Indeed, on some days it is even difficult to determine the sign of the news.  
However, it is clearly the case that the volatility of war-related news was higher on these 
days relative to the other days in that period.  For a set of days with low variance of the 
war risk factor, we choose days as close as possible to, but not included in, those listed in 
Table 1.
7 
  Using these sets of dates, we apply the above estimators to nine U.S. financial 
variables that are potentially influenced by the risk of war.  In the analysis, we estimate 
the effects of the war risk factor using two variables at a time, as described above, where 
                                                 
5 The strength of the instruments depends on their correlations with the independent variable  1 x  .  In one 
case, this correlation equals the change in the variance of  1 x  .  In the other case, it equals the change in 
the covariance between  1 x   and  2 x  . 
6 To be sure, there are other important events regarding the possibility of war, such as the day that President 
Bush first called on the world to confront Iraq in front of the U.N. General Assembly (9/12/02), the day that 
resolution 1441 passed the U.N. Security Council (11/8/02), and the day following the first attacks against 
Iraq (3/20/03).  However, those events were largely anticipated and therefore did not represent news about 
the risk of war.  In fact, financial markets moved very little on those days. 
7 Choosing low-variances days that are close to the high-variance days helps to minimize any changes in 
variance arising from the other factors.  8
the first (normalized) variable is always taken to be the two-year Treasury yield.
8  The 
results are reported in Table 2.  In presenting the results, we show the impact of a change 
in  1 z  by –0.25.  Thus, all reported coefficients represent movements induced by an 
increase in war risk that is large enough to cause a 25 basis point drop in the two-year 
yield.  
  The table shows the coefficients obtained under all three of the instruments 
determined above and their significance levels.  As can be seen, the coefficients obtained 
using the different instrument sets are typically close to one another, suggesting that the 
structure that we have assumed is not strongly violated in the data.  On the instances 
when the coefficients differ considerably, the estimator based on the  2   instrument is 
typically less precise, and the estimator obtained using the combined instrument set ( 3  ) 
accordingly tends to be closer to that based on the  1   instrument.  In interpreting the 
results, we will focus on the point estimates found using the  3   instrument. 
  The primary finding of this paper is that many of the financial variables 
considered are significantly affected by the risk of war.
9  An increase in the risk of war of 
the magnitude considered results in a jump in the price of the year-ahead oil futures 
contract by about 77 cents, as one might expect.  The increase in war risk also appears to 
weigh on the prices of risky assets in U.S. financial markets.  In particular, equity prices 
fall nearly 4 percent, and corporate yield spreads rise.  Investment-grade (BBB) bond 
spreads widen 5 basis points, which is statistically significant but small in magnitude, 
while yield spreads for lower-quality issuers increase more considerably, with the high-
yield spread increasing 34 basis points.  In terms of the Treasury yield curve, greater war 
risk pushes down the ten-year yield by about the same magnitude as the two-year yield, 
with 11 basis points of that reflecting a decline in break-even inflation (measured by the 
difference between the yields on the nominal ten-year Treasury note and the inflation-
                                                 
8 It is possible to implement this type of estimator using a larger number of variables at once, which results 
in additional overidentifying restrictions.  However, because we have a limited number of observations to 
estimate the change in the variance-covariance matrix, we took this more restricted approach. 
9 The Treasury yields reported are par off-the-run yields from an estimated yield curve; the corporate yields 
are indexes computed by Merrill Lynch, and the corporate yield spreads are measured relative to the 
Treasury yield curve; the on-the-run premium is also computed relative to this yield curve; the prices of oil 
futures and gold are taken from Bloomberg; and the dollar is a broad trade-weighted index calculated by 
the Federal Reserve Board.   9
indexed ten-year Treasury note).  Lastly, the increase in war risk induces some 
weakening of the dollar.   
  Somewhat surprisingly, though, war risk does not appear to significantly affect 
the price of gold or the liquidity premium on the on-the-run ten-year Treasury note.  One 
could interpret these last findings as indicating that increases in the risk of war have not 
generated a widespread flight by investors towards safe and liquid assets.  This 
interpretation raises the possibility that the negative effects on the prices of equities and 
corporate bonds, Treasury yields, and the dollar partly reflect a perception among 
investors that the prospect of war (and the associated increases in energy prices) poses 
downside risk to the U.S. economy, rather than a shift in investors’ risk preferences.  Of 
course, the focus of this paper is on the measurement of the effects of war risk, rather 
than assessing the reasons for those effects.   
  It is worth speculating a bit at this point about the interpretation of the war risk 
factor.  News about the war on any given day is presumably multidimensional; it might 
include information about the likelihood of war, its potential success and duration, and 
whether it will be carried out unilaterally or by a broader coalition.  Under our approach, 
this information is combined into a single factor, so that the results capture the impact of 
the most important aspects of the war-related news.
10  Judging from financial market 
commentary on the days listed in Table 1, it appears that increases in the war risk factor 
are most closely associated with greater uncertainty about the timing of the war and a 
greater likelihood that the conflict will last for an extended period.
11  However, it is worth 
repeating that an advantage of our estimator is that one does not have to make such a 
determination. 
  The results from Table 2 can be used to assess the importance of the risk of war 
relative to other factors affecting asset prices.  The first two columns of Table 3 show the 
variance of each variable computed over the war news days and that computed over the 
                                                 
10 Our approach could be refined if one were willing to make assumptions about the variances of the 
individual components of the war risk factor.  However, we believe that imposing such assumptions is 
infeasible.  
11 Two dates immediately following the beginning of the war provide relevant examples.  On March 21, the 
war risk factor appears to have declined (with the two-year Treasury yield rising 7 basis points) on the 
perception that the war would be short and successful.  On March 24, by contrast, the war risk factor 
appears to have increased sharply (with a 12 basis point drop in the two-year yield) in response to 
perceived military setbacks over the preceding weekend.  10
set of other days.
12  As can be seen, the variance of each of the financial variables 
increases considerably on the war news dates, as one would expect under our 
assumptions.  According to the set-up above, the greater amount of war-related news on 
the specified days increases the variance of  j x   by  ) ( 1
2 2
1 z d j    .  Given the 
normalization for the first financial variable, this increase is equal to  ) ( 1
2
1 x Var d j    .  
Thus, using the difference in the variance of the two-year Treasury yield in the two 
samples as the measure of  ) ( 1 x Var   , we can obtain an estimate of the shift in the 
variance of each financial variable that is attributable to the increased volatility of the war 
risk factor on the specified days, shown in the third column. 
  As can be seen, the shift in the variances of the financial variables arising from 
the war risk factor can be considerable.  These shifts can be used to compute a lower 
bound on the portion of the variance of a given financial variable that is attributable to 
war-related news.  In particular, the shift in the war-induced variance has to be smaller 
than the level of the war-induced variance on the war news days, and would only be the 
same if there were no war-related news on the other (low variance) days.  Thus, the 
portion of the variance of the jth financial variable that is due to war-related news must 
be greater than  ) ( / ) ( 1
2
1 j j x Var x Var d     .  This measure, reported in column 4, is quite 
high for some of the variables considered, indicating that the risk of war accounted for a 
sizable portion of the variance of many of the variables (those with significant 
coefficients) on the war news days.   
  Moreover, because the war news days are much more volatile than the other days 
in the sample, the war news factor accounts for a considerable portion of the movements 
in the financial variables throughout this period.  Indeed, consider the behavior of each 
financial variable for the ten-week period spanned by our dates, from January 6 to March 
17.  This period includes 47 business days, of which 17 represent the war news dates 
specified above.  Assuming that the daily changes in a given financial variable are 
serially independent, we can compute the variance of the cumulative change in that 
variable over this ten-week period, and then determine how much of this variance can be 
                                                 
12 These variances are measured simply by the average size of 
2 x   in the two samples.  11
attributed to the increase in the volatility of the war risk factor on the 17 days specified.  
The results, shown in the final column, indicate that the war risk factor still accounts for a 




  This paper provides empirical evidence that the risk of war that accumulated over 
the first several months of 2003 had a significant impact on a number of U.S. financial 
variables.  This period obviously involved considerable volatility of the perceived risk of 
war.  The basis for our methodology is that one can determine a particular set of days 
during this period on which the news about the outlook for war was particularly 
prominent.  We show that determining this set of dates is sufficient to estimate the impact 
of the war risk factor, even if that factor itself cannot be measured.  
The findings accord well with much of the anecdotal evidence offered by 
financial market participants over this period.  Of course, the more formal estimation 
approach taken here has the advantages of quantifying those effects and determining 
whether they are statistically significant.  The results indicate that increases in war risk 
caused a rise in oil prices, a fall in Treasury yields and equity prices, a widening of 
corporate yield spreads, and a decline in the dollar.  By contrast, we do not find that the 
risk of war had a significant impact on the price of gold or on the liquidity premium on 
the on-the-run ten-year Treasury note. 
  Overall, the risk of war appears to have been a remarkably important factor in 
determining movements in U.S. financial variables over the ten-weeks leading up to the 
onset of war with Iraq.  Indeed, of those variables that were found to have a significant 
response, the risk of war accounted for a considerable portion—with a lower bound of 
between 13 and 63 percent—of the variances of their cumulative movements over that 
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Dates of High Variance of War Risk
Date Event War Risk
1/9/03 U.N. inspectors report finding no chemical weapons Decreased
Reports that N. Korea will abandon nuclear arms program if U.S. reaffirms non-hostility agreement Decreased
1/10/03 N. Korea announces withdrawal from nuclear non-proliferation treaty Increased
1/16/03 Reports that Saddam Hussein might consider exile Decreased
U.N. weapons inspectors find empty chemical warheads Increased
1/17/03 Saddam Hussein gives speech stating that Iraq is ready for war Increased
1/27/03 Blix report: "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament" Increased
1/29/03 President Bush gives State of Union Address Unclear
Secretary Powell says U.S. would assist Saddam Hussein if he sought exile Decreased
1/30/03 President Bush comments on continued lack of Iraqi cooperation Increased
2/5/03 Secretary Powell makes U.N. presentation in effort to build a broad coalition Unclear
2/10/03 Reports that Iraq will unconditionally allow surveillance flights Decreased
2/12/03 Secretary Powell says impasse has reached "moment of truth"  Increased
U.S. intelligence says N. Korea can reach U.S. with nuclear missle Increased
2/13/03 Rumors that President Bush set deadline to attack without resolution Increased
2/14/03 Blix report interpreted as reducing chance of immediate war Decreased
3/5/03 Secretary Powell makes tough comments on Iraq Increased
3/7/03 Reports that bin Laden close to being captured Decreased
3/10/03 Turkey rejects U.S. use of military bases Unclear
3/13/03 CNN reports that Iraq might surrender before conflict begins Decreased




Estimated Impact of Increase in War Risk 




IV w/ 1   
Eqn. (7) 
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Last three columns show estimates of  1 , j d , or the impact of the war risk factor on each financial variable 






Variances of Financial Variables 
 















Two-year Treasury Yield  .00096  .00594  --  --  -- 
Ten-year Treasury Yield  .00096  .00632  .00535  84.7  62.8 
Break-even Inflation  .00109  .00153  .00088  57.1  31.0 
Liquidity Premium  .00003  .00004  .00000  4.7  2.7 
S&P 500  1.554  3.293  1.126  34.2  19.7 
BBB Yield Spread  .00022  .00042  .00022  52.8  15.5 
High-yield Yield Spread  .00190  .01160  .00935  80.6  52.0 
Oil Price   .060  .124  .047  38.2  19.2 
Gold Price  18.88  32.83  .13440  0.4  0.2 
Dollar .019  .067  .015  22.9  13.5 
See Table 2 for additional details about the variables used. 
 
 
 